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 Abstract 
How can someone reconcile the desire to eat meat, and a tendency toward vegetarian 
ideals? How should we reconcile contradictory moral values? How can we aggregate 
different moral theories? How individual preferences can be fairly aggregated to 
represent a will, norm, or social decision? Conflict resolution and preference 
aggregation are tasks that intrigue philosophers, economists, sociologists, decision 
theorists, and many other scholars, being a rich interdisciplinary area for research. 
When trying to solve questions about moral uncertainty a meta understanding of the 
concept of normativity can help us to develop strategies to deal with norms 
themselves. 2nd-order normativity, or norms about norms, is a hierarchical way to think 
about how to combine many different normative structures and preferences into a 
single coherent decision. That is what metanormativity is all about, a way to 
answer: what should we do when we don’t know what to do?  In this study, we will 
review a decision-making strategy dealing with moral uncertainty, Maximization of 
Expected Choice-Worthiness. This strategy, proposed by William MacAskill, allows for 
the aggregation and inter-theoretical comparison of different normative structures, 
cardinal theories, and ordinal theories. In this study, we will exemplify the 
metanormative methods proposed by MacAskill, using has an example, a series of 
vegetarian dilemmas. Given the similarity to this metanormative strategy to expected 
utility theory, we will also show that it is possible to integrate both models to address 
decision-making problems in situations of empirical and moral uncertainty. We believe 
that this kind of ethical-mathematical formalism can be useful to help develop 
strategies to better aggregate moral preferences and solve conflicts. 
Keywords: Moral uncertainty. Normative uncertainty. Metanormativity. Maximization 
of expected choice-worthiness. 
Resumo 
Como é que alguém pode conciliar o desejo de comer carne, e uma tendência para 
com ideais vegetarianos? Como devemos reconciliar valores morais contraditórios? 
Como podemos agregar diferentes teorias morais? Como é que preferências individuais 
podem ser agregadas de forma justa para representar uma vontade, norma, ou 
decisão social? A resolução de conflitos e a agregação de preferências são tarefas que 
intrigam filósofos, economistas, sociólogos, teóricos da decisão, e muitos outros 
estudiosos, sendo uma área interdisciplinar rica para a investigação. Ao tentar resolver 
questões sobre incerteza moral, uma meta compreensão do conceito de normatividade 
pode ajudar-nos a desenvolver estratégias para lidar com as próprias normas. A 
normatividade de segunda ordem, ou normas sobre normas, é uma forma hierárquica 
de pensar sobre como combinar muitas estruturas normativas e preferências diferentes 
em uma única decisão coerente. É disso que se trata a metanormatividade, uma forma 
de responder: o que devemos fazer quando não sabemos o que fazer?  Neste estudo, 
iremos rever uma estratégia de tomada de decisão que trata da incerteza moral, 
Maximização da Escolha Valiosa-Esperada. Uma estratégia proposta por William 
MacAskill que permite a agregação e comparação interteórica de diferentes estruturas 
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normativas, teorias cardeais e teorias ordinais. Neste estudo, vamos exemplificar os 
métodos metanormativos propostos por MacAskill, usando como exemplo uma série de 
dilemas vegetarianos. Dada a semelhança desta estratégia metanormativa com a 
teoria da utilidade esperada, mostraremos também que é possível integrar ambos os 
modelos para abordar problemas de tomada de decisão em situações de incerteza 
empírica e moral. Acreditamos que este tipo de formalismo ético-matemático pode ser 
útil para ajudar a desenvolver estratégias para melhor agregar preferências morais e 
resolver conflitos. 
Palavras-chave: Incerteza moral. Incerteza Normativa. Metanormatividade. 
Maximização da Escolha Valiosa-Esperada. 
Introduction 
“...the rarest of all human qualities is consistency”. 
― Jeremy Bentham 
 
Humanity is vast and multifaceted, as our species is currently spread out throughout 
over 195 countries. And in this landscape, humanity has not yet achieved the status of a 
single cosmopolitan society. However, our shared environment forces us to have to deal 
with each other, something that is often a reason for conflict, given our differences in their 
most diverse forms. Situations where our differences are aggravated often involve some 
sort of moral disagreement, and this is one of the most persistent sources of conflict in 
human life. ACLED1  (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project) is an interactive 
online infographic that shows in which countries occur armed confrontations between 
state forces and civil, rebel groups. It informs us how the occurrence of conflicts in our 
world is something sadly common. In March 2020, UN Secretary-General António 
Guterres, given the current pandemic caused by the new coronavirus COVID-19, said in a 
statement2 : “The fury of the virus illustrates the madness of war [...] For the warring 
parties, I say: withdraw from hostilities. Silence the weapons; stop the artillery; stop the air 
raids. This is crucial...”.   
One of the most significant differences between societies, and individuals, are their 
moral values, their preferences, their normative principles, their ethics. The problem of 
                                            
1 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). Available at: 
https://acleddata.com/2020/08/18/mid-year-update-10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2020/ 
Accessed on: August 25, 2020. 
2  Transcript of the Secretary-General’s virtual press encounter on the appeal for global 
ceasefire. United Nations Secretary-General, Statements/Reports. 23 March 2020. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/press-encounter/2020-03-23/transcript-of-the-secretary-
generals-virtual-press-encounter-the-appeal-for-global-ceasefire Accessed on August 25, 2020. 
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aggregating conflicting preferences and solving moral dilemmas is something that intrigues 
philosophers from ancient times till the present day  (LOCKHART, 2000; ŻURADZKI, 
2016; TARSNEY, 2018; HICK, 2018; BARRY & TOMLIN, 2016; 2019), but surprisingly, 
when compared to the study of empirical uncertainty we see that the study of moral 
uncertainty is a much less explored field3 . Moral uncertainty research has applications from 
the most micro level, “how can an individual reconcile contradictory preferences?”, to the 
macro, “how can societies (and the world) aggregate their preferences into a single 
coherent ordered structure?”.  
An interesting study, with empirical findings supporting moral pluralism, showing 
the difference between moral principles among different cultures is the Moral Machine 
experiment conducted by Awad et al. (2018; 2020). The Moral Machine is an experiment 
implemented on an online platform4, to explore moral dilemmas faced by autonomous 
vehicles, using the formal framework of the well-known Trolley Problems. The platform 
achieved a very large reach, gathering 40 million decisions, in ten languages, from 10 
million people in several different countries. In the experiment global moral preferences 
were summarized in nine different groups, which characterize certain decision-making 
patterns, like a preference for saving pedestrians, preferring to spare the young, and others. 
Using the individual variations in preferences based on the demographic data of the 
participants, transcultural ethical variations were observed, which were grouped into three 
major groups of countries: Eastern (mainly formed by Islamic and Confucian countries and 
cultures), Western (formed by Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox countries in Europe), and 
Southern (formed by Latin American countries in Central and South America and also 
several African countries). The results revealed marked differences between the preferences 
among the three groups. 
Findings like those of Awad et al. only reinforce the idea that we live in a morally 
pluralistic world. Given this reality, how can we reach a consensus between different 
cultures and individuals? To preserve our cultural and moral pluralism it is important to 
develop techniques to aggregate moral preferences and solve moral conflicts. Some tools to 
help us deal with this problem can be obtained from areas such as Social Choice Theory, 
Expected Utility Theory, and Voting Theory. In this study, we will investigate heuristics to 
reach a (social) consensus or (individual) decision in situations of moral uncertainty, 
namely: how to act when we don’t know how to act? 
                                            
3 A search on “Google Scholar” can show that the results for “empirical uncertainty” (4,150,000 
results) double the ones related to “moral uncertainty” (2,180,000 results) in August 2020. 
4 Available at: https://www.moralmachine.net/ Accessed on: August 25, 2020. 
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2nd-Order normativity 
 
First of all, it is important to define some terms. Normativity is something that 
implies a need for action, something that should be pursued, such as “what should be” or 
“what should be done”. When we talk about normative reasoning we are talking about a 
form of decision-making that is based on some kind of normative principle, such as 
deontological rules, a utility function, or common sense itself. A more systematic approach 
to the study of normativity would be metaethics, which also tries to define what the nature 
of “good” is, or rather the nature of normative statements. While first-order normative 
statements like “killing’s are wrong” clearly imply a form of action or behavior, defining 
“wrong” as something that should not be done, metaethical statements, or metanormative 
statements, deal with questions like “What is wrong? What is goodness? What does it mean 
for something to be wrong or right?”. 
Metanormativity can be defined as the study of norm structures in general, when 
we refer to the metanormative we are referring to norms about norms, i.e., sets of norms that 
can help in situations where there is uncertainty about 1st-order norms (ŻURADZKI, 
2016). Metanormative strategies are heuristics to evaluate between different first-order 
normative structures. If we think of ways to aggregate preferences, values, different moral 
theories, we need a metanormative strategy to accomplish such a process. However, it’s 
important to make a distinction between moral pluralism (BERLIN, 1997) and moral 
uncertainty. In situations of moral uncertainty adopting a pluralistic metanormative strategy 
is a possibility. Instead of distributing our belief between two (or more) different moral 
theories (e. g., Kantianism and Utilitarianism), the agent can unite both theories into a new 
first-order normative theory (KING, 2008). An individual can be equally convinced given 
the merit of two different moral theories, having no uncertainty about which is the more 
valid, and importing principles from both theories into his new theory (e. e., quasi-
utilitarianism). For example, the subject believes that the maximization of “well-being” 
should be pursued given certain deontological restrictions, such as “lying is wrong”, or 
“don’t murder children”. However, to aggregate two or more moral theories is not the 
same as being uncertain. In the above case, the subject did not doubt the merit or value of 
Kantianism or Utilitarianism, so there is no moral uncertainty. Only if the individual 
possesses uncertainty about the validity of some   principle in comparison with   
principle, then we can assign moral uncertainty to this agent.   
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An agent is under normatively uncertainty when several moral theories point to 
different or conflicting decisions, so that this agent can then use a 2nd-order norms to solve 
a moral dilemma. A plausible conclusion from this argument is: “an agent may also be 
uncertain about which 2nd-order norm to apply”, in which case we would need “meta-
metanormativity” (3rd-order norms). Thus, we can see that the concept of normativity, 
ethics, rules in general, implies an infinite hierarchy of norms that a “strongly uncertain” 
agent may have to recursively explore. Should the possibility of an n-order hierarchy 
discourage metanormative reasoning? Are there normative questions that can lead to 
infinite recursions, such as “Is God good”? Perhaps during the process of evaluating 
different moral theories, and becoming uncertain about the validity of one theory versus 
another, we become obliged to use a 2nd-order normative rules, and by becoming uncertain 
about which 2nd-order normative rule to use we have to resort to a higher metanormative 
level ad infinitum.  However, we argue that such cases are the exception contrary to the 
norm. Hardly moral questions have no form of influence in the physical world so that no 
subjective or objective attribution of probability can be made. Another argument against 
the problem of infinite recursion is that the agent only needs to regress until a decision can 
be made. This is imperative in any scenario where the agent is rationally limited since only 
agents with infinite rational capabilities could perform such recursive processes. If the 
agent follows the recursive path through the metanormative hierarchy and reaches the 
    -order, its “maximum normative epistemic reach”, there being no convergence, then 
this agent is irreparably uncertain. 
Metanormative Strategies 
 
One of the most know metanormative strategies to deal with the problem of moral 
uncertainty is “My Favorite Theory” (GUSTAFSSON & TORPMAN, 2014). To exemplify 
it, let us imagine the following problem, involving a dilemma that many people dabbling 
with vegetarian ideas have to face: 
Ana finds herself in a moral dilemma. Ana is undecided about whether to buy a 
meatloaf or a cheese loaf, and Ana has beliefs in different moral theories.  Ana has     
belief in a moral theory (  ) that assigns moral value to cattle life. Meanwhile, Ana has 
    belief in another moral theory (  ) that does not assign any moral value to the life of 
cattle. The utility of a meatloaf and cheese loaf for Ana are     and    respectively, for 
both moral theories. According to    the death of a cow is evaluated as      , making a 
meatloaf worth     . According to the   , Ana only needs to choose between a cheese 
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loaf (  ) and a meatloaf (   ), because the value of cattle life is not considered. What should 
Ana do? 
                   
                
                
 
My Favorite Theory (MTF) proposes that we make our choice based on the moral 
theory that we have the greatest belief, thus, in the dilemma above Ana using the MTF 
strategy would choose the moral theory   , and would buy the meatloaf. An obvious 
question for the reader might be: “can’t we do better than that?”, and how should Ana act 
if her beliefs in    and    are the same? In situations where beliefs are equally distributed 
among the moral theories under consideration. MTF does not provide us with a 
satisfactory solution. We assume that the option of “throwing a fair coin” would not be a 
moral or rational attitude5. MTF also recommends the individual to make “morally risky” 
decisions when her belief is divided almost indifferently. For example, if Ana has     
belief in   and     belief in   , MTF still recommends meatloaf, even though more than 
    of Ana’s moral beliefs are committed to a penalty almost 10 times greater than the 
gain of a meatloaf. 
In our view, better solutions than MTF were proposed, such as the theoretical 
negotiation approach of Greaves and Cotton-Barratt (2019), and “Moral Hedging” 
(HICKS, 2019). However, in this study, we will explore the propositions made by William 
MacAskill (2014), known as the Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness (MEC), 
Variance Voting (VV), and Borda Rule (BR). Unlike MTF, MEC, Variance Voting, and 
Borda Rule are comparative approaches. Comparative approaches suppose that the 
normative agent decision-making should not be based only on the credence to different 
moral theories, but also on the degree of choice-worthiness that the theories attribute to 
different actions. MTF is a noncomparative metanormative strategy. In order that an inter-
theoretical comparison between different moral theories can be made, MacAskill first 
defines different types of moral theories as follows: 
                                            
5 Imagine Anna attending animal rights protests on Monday and gutting a cow on Tuesday. 
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• Cardinal Theories: Moral theories are cardinally measurable if beyond an 
order of preference, “what is better than what” the theory can say how 
much something is better than the other. That is, besides saying that 
   , the theory says how much   is better, through a quantifier    :    
   {                } 
For example,          , where        means that   is     units of 
value better than  . Consequential moral theories, such as utilitarianism, 
are examples of Cardinal theories. 
• Ordinal Theories: moral theories are ordinal if they only present an ordinal 
preference relationship, i. e: 
   {         } 
For example, an ordinal theory, as some deontological version of 
Kantianism may dictate that “lying is wrong”. However, such a theory 
does not tell us how much worse lying is than another action, it just 
provides us with an order of preferences;  
                      {                              } 
Moral deontological theories are usually ordinal theories. 
We can say that cardinal theories are the ones that provide us with the most 
information, since besides a preference ranking, they make available to us a comparative 
magnitude between preferences, while ordinal theories are the least informative normative 
structures. The best kind of situation in a decision-making under moral uncertainty is when 
we have to compare different moral theories that are cardinal and are inter-theoretically 
comparable (it is when we have more information). Inter-theoretical comparability refers to 
the fact that not always cardinal theories are inter-theoretically comparable, that is, there is 
not always a nonarbitrary exchange rate between the units of “Choice-Worthiness” 
between theories.  
Maximization of Expected 
Choice-Worthiness, Variance 
Voting, and Borda Rule 
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To solve the decision problem of moral uncertainty, and the problem of inter-
theoretical comparability, MacAskill (2014) recommends the following methods: 
1) Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness (MEC): the MEC is used if all the 
moral theories considered by the agent are cardinal and inter-theoretical 
comparable theories; 
2) Variance Voting (VV): used when the moral theories under consideration are 
cardinal but not inter-theoretically comparable; 
3) Borda Rule (BR): if all the theories under consideration are ordinal. It is 
important to realize that it is possible to reduce a cardinal theory to an 
ordinal. However, much information (the magnitude of preferences) is lost 
in the process. 
All of the strategies cited aim at maximizing the “expected choice-worthiness” of 
the decision-maker under of moral uncertainty. This value is the decision-makers’ belief in 
a particular moral theory, multiplied by the moral value of a certain action. In the ideal case, 
where the theories evaluated are all cardinal and inter-theoretically comparable, the value of 
the expected choice-worthiness of an action,      , is given as follows: 
      ∑           
 
   
 
Where       represents the credibility (belief) of the decision-maker in    (some particular 
moral theory), while        represents the “choice-worthiness”, according to   , of   (an 
action that the decision-maker can choose). Let’s use Ana’s example again in her choice 
between buying a meatloaf or a cheese loaf, divided between two different moral theories, 
   (    belief) and    (    belief), which have different opinions about the moral value 
of animal life. The moral values attributed to each action are described again below: 
                   
                
                
 
Using the MEC we arrive at the following result: 
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In case the moral theories evaluated do not have a consistent exchange rate 
between units of choice-worthiness, MacAskill proposes to first normalize in some way the 
choice-worthiness values.  In areas like statistics, normalization is common practice when 
we are evaluating values measured at different scales, so normalization brings the values to 
a new common “fictitious” value, so we normalize the moral theories evaluated before 
calculating the traditional MEC. Normalization by Variance Voting is done by the variance 
of the choice-worthiness values in each moral theory. However, other forms of 
normalization are possible, such as standardization or Z-score. Variance is a measure that 
tells us about the scattering of data distribution, that is, how far the scored values of each 
moral theory tend to be from the mean. Normalizing by variance intuitively means letting 
each moral theory individually choose its exchange rate, using the dispersion of its    
values as a scale. Thus, the VV of an action is calculated as follows: first, we obtain the 
“mean value” of the    values of a given moral theory (   ), then we calculate the 
variance ( ) by adding the quadratic differences from the mean, divided by the number of 
possible actions ( ): 
    
∑         
 
 
   
     
       
   
 
Let’s imagine the example used above again, but now the    and    theories are not 
inter-theoretically comparable. Ana has the same belief distribution between the moral 
theories as to the previous example (       and       ), the utility of a meatloaf 
and cheese loaf for Ana are     and    respectively. However, moral theory    assigns 
100 times more value to meat (                 and                 ) than   . 
What should Ana do? According to VV we first need to normalize the values by variance and 
then apply the MEC: 
    
                           
 
        
    
                           
 
          
Metanormativity: Questions of moral and empirical uncertainty  11 
 
 
               
           
       
        
                  
         
       
       
               
          
       
        
                  
       
       
         
                   
                     
                        
 
Using the MEC in the normalized choice-worthiness values we have the following 
result: 
                                             
                                               
Normalization by variance allows an inter-theoretical comparison between moral 
theories with completely different scales of value, allowing moral theories themselves to 
define their exchange rate based on how much the choice-worthiness values are distributed. 
In the above case, Ana again should choose the cheese loaf, because of the high variance in 
   that decreases the normalized values of choice-worthiness for each available action. 
That is, a high variance in the choice-worthiness values causes a penalization in the MEC 
evaluation in theories with very sparse distributions in choice-worthiness. Now, for the 
case where we have to compare moral theories, some cardinal and others ordinal, the 
method that MacAskill recommends is the Borda Rule (BR). In BR the information of 
consequentialist theories, which give the magnitude of a preference, is lost, and we can only 
count on the ordering of preferences of each moral theory. 
We will use as an example the following case, adapted from MacAskill (2014, p. 63), 
but still involving a vegetarian dilemma: Ana is going to dinner, and she has a considerable 
belief that animals are worthy of moral value. However, Ana is also divided into going to a 
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steakhouse (she has not yet fully transitioned to vegetarianism but sympathizes with the 
cause). The steakhouse is closer than the vegetarian restaurant. Besides, in the middle of 
the way between the steakhouse and the vegetarian restaurant, there is a fast-food franchise 
where maybe there are vegetarian options, but not as healthy as the vegetarian restaurant 
options. Ana is hungry and has just left home, what restaurant should Ana go?    
[S]: the Steakhouse; 
[V]: the vegetarian restaurant; 
[F]: the fast-food franchise. 
Ana has greater credibility in that eating meat, given her current state of hunger, is 
morally justifiable according to a variant of Utilitarianism. At the same time, Ana has a 
strong belief in a Common sense moral theory that prefers the vegetarian restaurant, or 
secondly, the fast-food which may have some vegetarian option. And finally, Ana has less 
belief in a moral Deontological theory which dictates that as long as she doesn’t eat meat, 
the sooner she can satisfy her hunger the better. Ana’s distribution of credibility among the 
moral theories she credits are: 
    of credibility in a variant of utilitarianism,            ; 
    of credibility in a variant of common sense,            ; 
    of credibility in a deontological theory,            . 
According to MTF, the right choice is to eat at the steakhouse (       ) tries 
to find the best decision using Voting Theory tools, and within this theory, the “gold 
standard” is the Condorcet method. A voting system uses a Condorcet method when: if 
most voters prefer   to  , then   is the Condorcet winner (the elected one), if there are 
multiple candidates, then the candidate who is preferred in all possible pairs of 
comparisons                   will be the Condorcet winner. This method 
compares all possible pairs of preferences (candidates) and declares the winner the 
preference that outperforms all others in a head-to-head tournament. However, it is not 
always possible for a Condorcet winner to emerge, so extensions to this method are 
necessary. The Condorcet method is also susceptible to the voting paradox, which occurs 
when the aggregation of social preferences becomes non-transitive, even if the preferences 
of all individuals is transitive. That is, even if all voters have transitive preferences in an 
election               the final result can still be non-transitive        
      , the voting paradox is a classic example of the composition fallacy (just because 
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all voters have transitively ordered preferences that don’t mean that the social choice will 
be transitively ordered) (GEHRLEIN & VALOGNES, 2001). 
Condorcet extensions, such as the Condorcet Minimax method and the Schulze 
method (LEVIN & NALEBUFF, 1995), exist to solve the voting paradox. However, as 
much as these methods are the best alternatives in electoral systems, they are not 
appropriate for metanormative decision strategies. That is because elections rarely have to 
deal with a group of voters whose numbers fluctuate, and on the contrary, our beliefs (the 
electorate) constantly vary among different moral theories. MacAskill (2016) argues that, at 
the very least, increasing our belief in a particular moral theory should not warm the 
ordering of preferences of that theory, something that Condorcet extensions do not 
accomplish very well. Condorcet extensions like Condorcet Minimax can make the “best 
preference” of moral theories with greater credence as sub-optimal options (MACASKILL 
2014, pp. 68-71). Given this limitation of Condorcet extensions, MacAskill proposes the 
following fitness condition: 
• Consistency Update: For all possible preferences and actions  , and for all 
moral theories   , if   is maximally appropriate according to   , and the 
decision-maker increases his credibility in   , keeping the relationships 
of his beliefs proportional among all other moral theories, A should still 
be maximally appropriate. 
As Condorcet extensions fail to preserve this condition of consistency update, this 
shows that Condorcet extensions are not appropriate for metanormative decision 
strategies. Therefore, we use the Borda Rule. This forme of score counting is generally the 
way championships of sporting events, like football, are judged, where we assign points in 
ascending order to favorite (best placed) competitors. To visualize the Borda Rule, and 
how it evaluates votes differently than Condorcet extensions, we can imagine a competition 
with   candidates, where each pair of possible candidates will face one against the other. In 
this situation, the Condorcet Minimax selects as the winner the candidate whose greatest 
pairwise defeat is smaller than the greatest pairwise defeat of any other candidate, using the 
magnitude of the biggest defeat as a tie-breaker criterion. The Borda Rule simply adds up 
the number of points of all the candidate’s victories in all possible contests/pairs (in the 
case of football, the winner is the one with the highest number of goals scored in victories). 
Thus, in a tournament where competitors    and    are the two best, and    won all 
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matches (including    by    ), but with a very small margin (scored few goals), this 
tournament evaluated by the Condorcet Minimax method would attribute the victory to 
competitor   . However,    was a much better competitor, lost only to   , but won all the 
other games with many points (goals) of difference. Condorcet Minimax gives much more 
weight to the victory and not the magnitude of the victories, while for the Borda Rule 
method the winner would be   . The argument in favor of the Borda Rule is that the 
magnitude of a victory should matter in preference elections when only ordinal theories are 
being evaluated, the moral theories being like the voters, ordering their preferences with a 
variable electorate (the credibility they have) and the actions being the candidates. 
The definitions of the Borda Rule for decisions in a situation of moral uncertainty 
are as follows (MACASKILL, 2016): 
• The Borda Score of option  , for any    theory, is equal to the number of 
possible options worse than A according to   , less the number of 
possible options better than A according to   ; 
• The credence-weighted Borda Score of an option   is the sum, by all moral 
theories    that the decision-maker has credence, of the Borda Score of 
  according to the    theory multiplied by the decision maker’s belief in 
  ;  
• Borda Rule: An option A is more appropriate than an option   if, and 
only if,   has a higher credence-weighted border score than  . If   and 
  have the same credence-weighted border score,   and   are equally 
appropriate.  
Let’s go back to Ana’s situation, with a dilemma between three possible restaurants 
(steakhouse, vegetarian, fast-food), evaluated according to three different moral theories as 
follows:  
    of credibility in a variant of utilitarianism,            ; 
    of credibility in a variant of common sense,            ; 
    of credibility in a deontological theory,            . 
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The result of the table above can be explained as follows: in the case of      
       , and the “Steakhouse” decision, the utilitarian theory has two options lower 
than the “Steakhouse” option and none higher, so      , a value which we multiply 
by Ana’s credibility in        . To know the credence-weighted Borda score of each 
action, we add the contributions of each moral theory to each possible action: 
                                                  
                                                
                                                 
The Borda Rule recommends Ana to walk a little more and satisfy her hunger in the 
vegetarian restaurant. That’s because both the “Steakhouse” and “Fast-Food” options were 
the least preferred actions by at least one of the three moral theories that Ana has 
considerable credence, while the choice to go to the vegetarian restaurant was not the least 
preferred of any theory. 
Integrating MEC with Expected 
Utility Theory 
 
The formalism created by MacAskill (2014) is similar to the formalism of rational 
choice theory and Expected Utility Theory (von NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, 
1944), which allows us to integrate the two models into a single model, capable of assessing 
both the empirical uncertainty and the moral uncertainty of the decision-maker. If such 
assumptions can be accepted, then the theoretical principles of rational choice theory can 
be applied to metanormative strategies and reasoning under moral uncertainty 
(LOCKHART 2000; ROSS, 2006; SEPIELLI, 2009; BYKVIST, 2017). Critics of this view 
consider “duty” as something purely moral (HARMAN, 2015; WEATHERSON, 2002). 
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However, these authors do not provide a way in which decisions under moral uncertainty 
can be made by only applying moral principles. After all, what would be a moral agent, if 
not a rational agent that makes its decisions according to its normative beliefs and 
preferences? What a rational and moral decision-maker can do in situations of uncertainty 
is to dissolve the problem into its empirical and moral components. For example, in the 
case where Ana needed to choose between a meatloaf and a cheese loaf, several forms of 
empirical uncertainty can be added to the problem, such as: 
• What is the probability that if Ana stops buying the meatloaf, this will 
have a positive effect (less animal suffering) on the environment? 
Perhaps the lack of consumption will cause even worse situations for 
animals in captivity. 
• How sure is Ana about the sentience of large mammals like cows and 
bulls?  
• Could low meat consumption have even worse negative influences on 
human lives? 
• How much does the consumption of cheese, which is a dairy product 
(probably cow milk), harms animal life? 
All of these questions can help Ana’s choice because some of the conclusions of 
these facts can help to change Ana’s beliefs about a moral theory that places more value on 
animal life, or not. That is, the ability to acquire more information helps the agent to 
restrict the space of moral theories to those that best represent the real world. Thus, we 
integrate the MEC model with the expected utility theory as follows6: 
      ∑∑                    
 
   
 
   
 
Where,        is the value of the expected choice-worthiness of an action  ,       is the 
credibility of the decision-maker in moral theory   . And now instead of valuing the action, 
we value the         observation, i. e., the         consequence of action   according to 
  . Now we have a model that unifies empirical and moral uncertainty, where to find the 
                                            
6 We would like to point out that the first one to suggest this integration, to our knowledge, 
was Michael Aird, a Research Fellow at the Center on Long-Term Risk, in his LessWorng post 
“Making decisions when both morally and empirically uncertain”. Available at: 
https://www.lesswrong.com/s/4NFwxwzLzpiikfkk3/p/eYiDjCNJrR3w3WcMM Accessed on: 
August 25, 2020. 
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action with the highest choice-worthiness. The agent now also evaluates each possible 
result for the action taken (i. e., the purchase of meatloaf increasing rather than decreasing 
the suffering of animals), multiplying by the value that the result would bring (according to 
moral theory   ), multiplied by the credibility of the decision-maker in moral theory   . Let 
us now return to the example of Ana and her vegetarian dilemma to exemplify this 
approach: 
Ana has the same belief distribution between the moral theories of the first 
example (       and       ). In   , the choice to eat meatloaf causes       in 
Ana, and both theories guarantee     for eating the meatloaf and    for the cheese loaf. 
Now about the empirical uncertainty, let’s imagine that Ana believes with     credibility 
that buying meat increases animal suffering, and     chance that buying cheese leads to 
the same result. What should Ana do? According to MEC, integrated with the Expected 
Utility Theory: 
                                            
                                          
Again the model recommends that Ana should choose the cheese loaf. Just like we 
did with the MEC model, this extension can be spread to calculate several empirical 
uncertainties, and can also be applied in a heuristic way. If the agent is able to assign any 
naive notion of value and probability, we can come to the conclusion that a small risk in 
making a big “evil” does not justify the small gain of a meatloaf. We believe that such a 
form of reasoning seems a promising application of rational choice theory to decision 
problems involving moral uncertainty. The integration of the MEC model with expected 
utility theory can also be applied to Variance Voting and the Borda Rule. In the case of the 
Variance Voting, we only need to remember that the final choice-worthiness values must 
first be normalized by the variance. In the same way, the Borda Rule can also be extended, 
we just need to take into account the empirical uncertainty of the facts, for example, what 
credibility does Ana have that the vegetarian restaurant is open? What is the probability 
that the fast-food has a vegetarian menu? We just need to multiply this new probability 
values by each relevant consequence and multiply the result by each moral theory that Ana 
credits. The similarities between Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness and 
Maximization of Expected Utility may serve as an example that morality and rationality, at 
least in a pragmatic sense, are not dichotomic concepts. 
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Conclusion 
 
The methods proposed by William MacAskill, Maximization of Expected-Choice-
Whortines, Variance Voting, and Borda Rule, are promising metanormative strategies, and 
they are not the only ones. Perhaps these are the kind of tools we need to define a way to 
carry out reflective normative reasoning in states of moral uncertainty. The similarity of 
MEC with Expected Utility Theory allows simple and intuitive integration of both 
methodologies.  That’s because MEC was most likely inspired by rational choice theory. 
Perhaps this is even what defines a good process of rational and moral decision, the careful 
analysis of the parts that involve the problema. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, in his 
Meditations, has a passage that reflects on this idea: “nothing is as productive for the elevation of 
the mind as being able to examine methodically and truly every object that presents itself to you in life”7. 
However, the metanormative project it’s not finished, many rules still seem arbitrary, and 
perhaps they can be improved, such as normalization by variance, and the choice between 
methods that are Condorcet extensions or not. Depending on the chosen method, different 
moral theories and preferences will be better ranked. 
Perhaps the reader believes that this method expresses a certain bias towards 
consequentialism. However, we argue that what is truly stated is that cardinal theories 
possess a greater amount of information about the moral value of possible actions and 
outcomes. Even so, an inter-theoretical comparison is still possible, and deontological 
models can be worked within the MEC model through the Borda Rule. From a 
metanormative point of view, moral deontological theories (Ordinal), are a  specific case of 
a more general class of normative structures (Cardinal). The metanormative analysis also 
allows us a redefinition of concepts such as morality, so we suggest the following: 
• Agents can distribute their beliefs among moral theories as they wish, 
and moral theories can order choice-worthiness values of 
actions/observations in any way (moral pluralism). However, if the 
decision-maker is under moral uncertainty, and after updating its 
choice-worthiness values, chooses an action less valuable than another 
available action, according to its limitations and the moral theories it has 
credence on, the agent is non-normative. Or at least we cannot assign 
choice-worthiness values and moral beliefs to its choices consistently. 
                                            
7 Meditations, by Marcus Aurelius Antoninus. Book 3, 11. 
Metanormativity: Questions of moral and empirical uncertainty  19 
 
 
One last point we would like to mention is the need for the moral agent to deal 
with bounded rationality and the lack of logical omniscience. We defend the idea that 
subjective probabilities can be attributed, but as it is known, perfect Bayesian inference is 
something intractable for rationally bounded agents. We believe that a better understanding 
of concepts such as counterfactuality and uncertain probabilities can help us to develop 
better normative reasoning heuristics. After all, what hyperpriors can we use to estimate 
probabilities about unknown events? How do we assign probabilities to probabilities?  We 
intend to try to answer these questions in further studies, with the help of concepts like 
complexity, similarity, and simplicity. 
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